THE
Dan Smoot Report

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

DAN SMOOT

FREE CHINA!

On October 16, 1962, a Chinese communist invasion force of at least 100,000 soldiers struck at India's northeastern frontier. The Indians revealed themselves totally unprepared, despite the fact that the communists had been concentrating troops and making border raids in the high Himalayans for more than three years. Indian military equipment was old, inadequate, and in short supply; and troop morale seemed non-existent. The communists met virtually no resistance as they poured through mountain passes along a 1400 mile front, conquering thousands of square miles of Indian territory, moving into position to threaten the heartland of Indian agricultural, mineral, and industrial production.

On October 26, 1962, Nehru proclaimed a state of national emergency and asked for help. Nehru, an old friend of Khrushchev and an admirer of the Soviet Union, expected help from that quarter; but the Soviet Union "announced that it lines up on the side of Red China."[1] The United States, however — whom Nehru has consistently criticized and opposed on major international issues — responded immediately to Nehru's plea.

On December 9, 1962, W. Averell Harriman (Assistant Secretary of State) said (on an ABC television program — "Issues and Answers") that the Chinese invasion of India is intensifying a growing split between communist Russia and communist China. When asked whether the United States could do anything in the Indian affair to widen the split Harriman said:

"I don't think we're clever enough to do that sort of thing."

And Harriman added that the United States would be foolish to say or do anything at this point, which might tend to drive Moscow and Peking closer together.[2]

On December 10, 1962, an Associated Press story from Washington[3] said the United

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States had already rushed 15 million dollars in emergency aid to India and was contemplating a one-billion-dollar military aid program, which could last for years.

Sinister Parallels

Why are we giving this military aid to India? Because India is a friend? No. Ever since India became a nation in 1947, her government has been far friendlier to the Soviet Union than to us — despite our continuous, massive economic aid to India.

Because we feel that our aid will widen the alleged split between Soviet communists and Chinese communists? Obviously not. Harriman's admission that the Kennedy Administration is not clever enough for that kind of maneuver indicates that this is not the purpose. Moreover, "the Soviet Union has announced that it lines up on the side of Red China" in the Indian affair.[1] Will not our aid to India, therefore, tend to close the alleged rift between the Soviet and Chinese communists? How can we square this with the warning of Harriman, and other top officials, that the United States must not do or say anything which might tend to close the rift?

Are we giving military aid to India, because we really think this is an effective way to fight communism in Asia? If our aid to India *is* based on the expectation that India will make an effective effort against communism, the expectation is quite ludicrous, as the whole history of the Indian nation proves.

In a letter formally notifying the Indian Ambassador in Washington of our willingness to help, the State Department said that the United States "is prepared to furnish assistance to the Government of India for the purpose of defense against the outright Chinese aggression directed from Peking."[4]

There, then, is the purpose of our military aid to India. Earlier in 1962, we forced the pro-western government of Laos to surrender to communism. Now we rush aid to help the pro-communist government of India defend itself against communism.

There is something odd here — and a great deal that is disturbingly reminiscent of the Korean situation in 1950.

Neither India nor any other Asian nation can be defended against communism, unless the source and center of communist power in Asia is destroyed, *in China.*

In the Korean war, American bombing of enemy supply dumps and troop-concentration centers across the Yalu River would have destroyed communist military power in Korea, with little or no loss in American lives. Our government would not permit our men thus to defend themselves;[5] but it was willing to sacrifice the lives of some 53,000 Americans to fight communists *in Korea.*[6]

With regard to India, our government appears to have the same attitude. The State Department's formal announcement of aid to India makes it clear that the Kennedy Administration entertains no thought of supporting any effort against the heart of the octopus, but will support ineffective efforts against tentacles of the octopus. We will do nothing against the center of communist power in China; but we will help India defend itself against "outright Chinese aggression," *in India.*

This will give the Chinese communists further training and experience in combatting American equipment and tactics, just as Korea did. And when we fail to achieve our announced objective in India — as we failed in Korea — the Chinese communists can again boast — as they did at the conclusion of the Korean tragedy — that America is a paper tiger which can roar but cannot fight.

Another sinister parallel is the Administration's apparent attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek — who is, and has been for years, the key to destroying communist power in Asia. There

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is abundant evidence that Chiang is willing, ready, and able to end the communist threat to all of Asia — by launching an invasion of the mainland and touching off shattering revolt against the communists. But the American government will not permit him to do so. It was the same in Korea.

The Tragic Story

The tragic story of China in the postwar period, 1945-49, has been documented and told many times.[7] Step by step, the American State Department (forcing Chiang Kai-shek to stop fighting for "negotiations" when he had communists on the run) helped negotiate Chiang Kai-shek off the continent of Asia, and into retreat and disgrace at Formosa.

Yet, even in the darkest hours, during the first year on Formosa, Chiang remained a serious menace to the communists. Occupying Formosa and all the offshore islands between Formosa and the mainland, Chiang practically controlled shipping in the Formosa Strait.

Moreover, his presence on Formosa — just ninety miles from the mainland — kept vast numbers of communist soldiers tied down on the coast, awaiting a dreadfully-feared invasion.

General James A. Van Fleet tells a story about old Syngman Rhee, standing at the docks weeping as he watched the first boatload of American boys land in South Korea, in 1950. He said America should not send her sons to die in Asia's war. All that Syngman Rhee wanted was material help from America — to offset what the communists were getting from the Soviets.[5]

Chiang Kai-shek also felt that Asians should fight Asia's war. Chiang had the best-trained and most experienced fighting force in Asia, and he volunteered to send it to help South Korea — either by fighting in Korea or by striking at the heart of the trouble on the Chinese mainland.

Truman refused Chiang's offer of troops. He also sent the American Seventh Fleet into Chinese waters to neutralize Formosa — to keep Chiang Kai-shek from trying to invade the Chinese mainland while the war was going on in Korea.[5] Of course, Truman also ordered the Seventh Fleet to keep the communists from invading Formosa; but that was meaningless, because the reds had no navy. Chiang Kai-shek did have a navy of sorts — the one that got him to Formosa in the first place.

Within a matter of weeks after our Seventh Fleet had thus neutralized the Formosa Strait, the communists pulled some 250,000 of their best soldiers out of defensive positions on the China coast and sent them into battle against Americans in Korea.

In doing so, however, the communists were not daring to challenge American military might. Through their espionage coverage in the United Nations and in western capitals, the communists had been assured that the United Nations would not permit the United States to strike back at communist China.

Our senior military commanders in Korea — Generals MacArthur, Clark, Stratemeyer, Van Fleet, Almond, Admiral Joy — have testified that we could have won the Korean war and destroyed communist power in Asia, without precipitating a general war and with fewer casualties than it cost us to lose.[5] The communists won, however, with the same weapon of "negotiation" which they had used against Chiang in China.

Time and again in Korea, when American forces had sustained heavy losses to beat back a communist offensive and have the reds at the point of annihilation, we would stop our men in order to have truce talks — just as George Marshall had forced Chiang to do in China five years before. Each time, the communists would use the truce talks as a cover for bringing up fresh forces and supplies for a surprise offensive.

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Republican politicians in the campaign of 1952 promised to stop this betrayal of American fighting men and to conclude the Korean war honorably. As it turned out, the Eisenhower Republican's notion of honor was to accept armistice terms dictated by the communists,[5] who have been openly violating their own armistice agreements since the day they were signed — in mid July, 1953.

The Korean war inflated Chinese communist prestige throughout the world, and enabled the communists to give their armies combat training and build them into a menacing military force.

In the winter of 1954, the reds opened a heavy artillery offensive against Chiang's offshore islands — threatening to take Formosa, the Pescadores (a group of islands near Formosa) and all other nationalist-held islands between Formosa and the mainland.

In January, 1955, President Eisenhower, supported by a congressional resolution, promised to use armed force if necessary to defend Formosa; but, at the same time, he put pressure on Chiang to abandon the Tachens group of offshore islands. There was abundant indication in 1955 that the Eisenhower Administration was willing to make a deal with the communists — to let them have Chiang's important islands of Matsu and Quemoy, in return for a communist promise to leave Formosa and the Pescadores alone.[8] No such deal was consummated, however, and the Formosan crisis simmered and disappeared from world notice — with the communists having gained a few offshore islands in the Tachens group, but Chiang still holding the key islands.

In the late summer of 1958, the crisis flared again. Communists heavily shelled the offshore islands and threatened to take Quemoy and Matsu Islands. This time, the Eisenhower Administration was openly eager for Chiang to abandon all offshore islands, in return for a communist promise to leave Formosa and the Pescadores alone. Chiang flatly refused. The communists were unable to accomplish anything by their own means; and so, the Formosan crisis of 1958 simmered down and trailed off again.

The Strong and the Weak

The communists' inability to keep their boast about taking Quemoy and Matsu; and the calm, gallant stand of Chiang's armed forces and people were a severe blow to the prestige and morale of the communists, a tremendous boost for free China.

In a speech to the National Assembly of the Republic of China, on February 20, 1960, Chiang Kai-shek said:

"We have in our hands the assurance of victory. Once the hour strikes . . . and once our armed forces and revolutionary uprisings on the mainland come together in a giant pincer movement, we shall be able to win as naturally as flood waters flowing down hill form a big stream. . . .

"The Chinese communists . . . are acting not only as the jackal of Soviet Russia in bringing harm to our people on the mainland, but are also the root of all troubles of the world today. . . . It has become clearer than ever that only after we have recovered the Chinese mainland . . . can communist totalitarianism be uprooted in the East. And only thus can world peace and the freedom . . . of mankind be re-established. . . .

"However, we cannot ask any of the friendly countries in the free world to provide us with military forces in our effort to recover our own territory. . . . I have always been of the view that the defeat of the Chinese communists and the deliverance of our mainland compatriots are a responsibility which we alone should assume. . . .

"The hatred of people on the mainland for the communists, the factional struggle within the communist party, the severity of the . . . purges. . . . all these facts indicate that the Chinese communist regime has been shaken to its very foundation and is heading toward a total collapse. . . .

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"In terms of population and size of territory, our task of national recovery would seem to be that of the few against the many. But . . . in terms of the loyalty of the people and the morale of the armed forces, it is a case of the strong against the weak."(9)

Chiang also warned the free world against policies of fear and appeasement, saying:

"Some of the [free-world] nations. . . . regard our holy mission of recovering the mainland . . . as an act that will touch off another world war. Their fear of the communists and their appeasing policy will eventually plunge . . . mankind into the abyss of a disastrous war. Herein lies the greatest danger for the free world today."(9)

Present Situation

The November 19, 1962, issue of *U.S. News & World Report* published an article entitled "With Mao Attacking India — Time to Unleash Chiang?" The article says Chiang Kai-shek feels that the time has come; and he has his invasion force ready; but the United States is dead set against his attacking the mainland.

In a column published by *The Wanderer,* on November 29, 1962, Dr. Robert Morris speculated that communist China's attack on India had an immediate two-fold purpose: (1) to dispel the growing image of red China as a power about to collapse because of internal economic troubles; and (2) by this show of force, to manipulate the United States into a deal comparable to the one Kennedy made with Khrushchev concerning Cuba: that is, American acceptance of, and guarantee of protection for, communist conquests already made, in return for communist promises not to be aggressive any more.

Dr. Morris recommended unleashing Chiang Kai-shek at once. He said:

"We should allow Chiang Kai-shek to commence preparations to return to his homeland. This would. . . . be making an army of five hundred thousand well-equipped troops, with an air force, available to help India almost immediately. It would take years to build up such an outside force. And this force would be operating behind the lines of battle on the mainland and amidst the very vulnerable Chinese communists. . . . It would tend to narrow the conflict by pitting Chinese against Chinese.

"It is hard to believe the reasoning that aiding Indians will not run the risk of 'escalating' the world struggle whereas aiding Free Chinese (with a claim of sovereignty to China) will. There is a good possibility that the Chinese people will welcome Chiang, whereas they could, only with difficulty, welcome Nehru and the Indians."

Chao Fu, a security officer in the Chinese communist Embassy at Stockholm, defected and sought American political asylum. He was brought to the United States in early November, 1962. On November 29, 1962, Chao Fu testified (through an interpreter) before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Chao Fu told of a recent document, issued by communist China's Foreign Minister, revealing that the Chinese communists fear an invasion by Chiang Kai-shek's forces. Chao Fu, a 27-year-old former peasant from northeastern China, said:

"Outstanding in my memory was the fear expressed that if Chiang Kai-shek's troops attacked at the same time as other enemies like India, the Chinese communists would be in a very critical situation. . . .

"I have left behind a wife and child who may be tortured and killed as a result of my escape. I have done this in the hope that I may be able to help my people by telling the world of the sufferings they endure under the communists.

"In my part of China, we seldom suffered famine or disaster. We were poor peasants, but were never hungry. Now, for 10 years, my family has not been able to kill a single pig. Conditions are even worse elsewhere. In the desolate areas, there are great labor camps, some of them with 150,000 prisoners in one camp alone, where the people live worse than animals."(10)

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In a new year's day speech (January 1, 1963), Chiang Kai-shek told the free Chinese to be "ready for actual combat duty at any moment." He urged the communist-enslaved Chinese on the mainland,

"... to give cover to underground movements, to support uprisings, to take the lead in staging strikes on the farms, in factories and in classrooms, to wreck communist communications lines, to set fire to communist military stockpiles, and to respond to any military action against the communists whether it is in the air, at sea, or on the ground."

Warning the free world against the false hope that there is a split between communist Russia and communist China, Chiang said the conflict between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung is merely a personal struggle for power:

"It does not portend any schism between the Soviet Union and the Peiping regime, nor does it represent a split between the two Marxist-Leninist partners, who are still like Siamese twins.

"This life-and-death struggle between Khrushchev and Mao will surely end in Mao's liquidation and surrender, for this is the jungle law of communism. . . . Khrushchev. . . . then will be able to . . . use one quarter of the world's population as his unlimited capital to launch a global war. If the free world should regard the personal conflict between the two as a split in the communist bloc, and take comfort in the hope that it may weaken . . . international communism in its attempt to communize the world . . . this will be the most dangerous wishful thinking there is."

Chiang explained that the Chinese communist invasion of India is evidence not of strength but of weakness — of "internal crises" goading the communists into "external aggression." He said:

"The Chinese communist regime . . . is the most ferocious and bellicose [of all communist regimes] . . . a foe that the free world must destroy. Tactically, however, it is . . . rotten from the inside, the most isolated and the weakest."

To all the people of China, free and communist enslaved, Chiang Kai-shek said, on the first day of 1963:

"We cannot afford to let such a fateful opportunity slip from our grip. . . . Today Mao Tse-tung and his gang, beset with internal and external troubles, are doomed. Our people as a whole, soldiers and civilians alike, including the ready-to-defect communist soldiers and cadres, already have moved into positions ready to close in on the communists from all sides. Now is the time for all of us to effect national recovery. . . ."[11]

The Time Is Now

During the Korean war, we had a sturdy ally in Syngman Rhee's South Korea. Rhee is gone now — to the obvious delight of appeasers in the American State Department; and now, though South Korea is still living on American aid, it is doubtful whether that country would be an asset to us, if we should get ourselves involved in another far eastern war with communism.

Chiang Kai-shek is the only strong anti-communist leader left in Asia. He has fought communists longer than any other man alive. Those who know him well say he is a devout Christian and a great leader — his life dedicated to one purpose: rescuing his homeland from the communists. He was 75, on October 31, 1962. Although he is still vigorous, it is obvious that his time is running out. If he is held in check until it is too late for him to accomplish his great purpose, it may then be too late for China and all the rest of Asia.

The free Chinese on Formosa have been living and building on the hope that they will be permitted to move against the mainland when the time is ripe. It is inconceivable that the time will ever be riper than now. Since Chiang retreated to Formosa, our aid to his government has averaged about 270 million dollars a year: 100 million in economic aid (chiefly in the form of surplus agricultural commodities); and 170 million in military aid (much of it equipment which United States Defense Department officials consider obsolescent).[12]

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Does it make sense for us to go on supporting the free Chinese as American wards, while prohibiting them from fighting the enemy we are protecting them against? Ultimately, inevitably, total war or total surrender will be the outcome of such a policy.

Some military authorities say that Formosa is vital to our defenses. This is true if, by *our defenses*, we mean the defense of Asia. If we are going to continue shouldering the responsibility of defending Asia, fighting her wars with our soldiers, we must anticipate that Asia will become a limitless graveyard for our sons. If that is the policy which we are determined to continue, we should hold on to every base and every piece of real estate we have anywhere in the Pacific, and acquire some more — at whatever the cost.

But why must we continue that policy? Neither the military security nor the economic prosperity of the American nation requires us to defend any part of Asia; and our government has no right to spend our money or the lives of our sons for such purpose. Bankruptcy and death await us if we do not disengage ourselves from involvement in the political and military affairs of the rest of the world, and look to our own national defense.

Yet, our involvement with regard to China has been sealed by the blood of 53,000 Americans who died at the hands of communists in Korea, and by the demands of our national honor. It is, at least, doubtful that China would ever have been enslaved by communism, or that the Korean war would ever have occurred, if it had not been for communist-appeasement policies which the American State Department has followed since Roosevelt's first wartime conference with Stalin.

The current affair in India gives us an excellent — and, possibly our last — opportunity to disengage ourselves in Asia, with honor.

If we would gather the military stores and civilian supplies which we are now scattering all over the far east (to nations which will never use them to fight communism) and divert these supplies to Chiang Kai-shek, giving him our blessing to move with his own men in his own way to do the best he can to

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rescue his homeland, we most probably would start an explosive disintegration of communist power in Asia.

What if Chiang failed?

One thing we can be sure of: if there are not enough Asians willing and able to fight for their own freedom, with us giving the wherewithal to fight, then Asia cannot be saved. We had better find that out now, before we blunder into another war that our sons will have to fight.

The one remaining strong, determined anti-communist leader in Asia says he wants to fight. Why not let him?

Or is our post-war program of "strengthening the free world to resist communism" a frightful lie, intended only to hobble America, and to destroy anti-communist countries like Katanga?

Bound Volume

We have sold all Bound Volumes of this *Report* for all years prior to 1962. Bound Volume VIII (containing 53 *Reports* published in 1962) will be available in late February. The limited number that can be printed will be sold on a first-come-first-paid basis.

Volume VIII will be bound in maroon fabrikoid, with gold lettering, and will be extensively indexed.

Price: $10.00, postage prepaid, within the United States.

FOOTNOTES

(1) *U.S. News & World Report,* November 12, 1962, p. 62

(2) UPI Column by Stewart Hensley, *Dallas Times Herald,* December 10, 1962

(3) *Dallas Times Herald,* December 10, 1962

(4) State Department Press Release No. 679, November 14, 1962

(5) *The Korean War and Related Matters, Report,* Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Government Printing Office, 1955

(6) Statistics on American casualties in Korea are widely disputed. Even official U.S. Government figures are contradictory. The figure of 53,000 American deaths in Korea was supplied by the late Alfred Kohlberg.

(7) *America's Retreat from Victory,* Joseph R. McCarthy, Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1951; *The China Story,* Freda Utley, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1951; *Wedemeyer Reports!,* General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1958, pp. 248 ff.

(8) Speeches of Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and William E. Jenner, United States Senate, May 9, 1955

(9) Chinese News Service press release, February 20, 1960

(10) "Red China Said to Fear Invasion, Revolt," *Chicago Tribune* Press Service story, *Dallas Morning News,* November 30, 1962

(11) Chinese News Service press release, January 1, 1963

(12) Article by Charles J. Murphy, *Life,* October 6, 1961

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Dan Smoot was born in Missouri. Reared in Texas, he attended SMU in Dallas, taking BA and MA degrees from that university in 1938 and 1940.

In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of American Civilization.

In 1942, he took leave of absence from Harvard in order to join the FBI. At the close of the war, he stayed in the FBI, rather than return to Harvard.

He worked as an FBI Agent in all parts of the nation, handling all kinds of assignments. But for three and a half years, he worked exclusively on communist investigations in the industrial midwest. For two years following that, he was on FBI headquarters staff in Washington, as an Administrative Assistant to J. Edgar Hoover.

After nine and a half years in the FBI, Smoot resigned to help start the Facts Forum movement in Dallas. As the radio and television commentator for Facts Forum, Smoot, for almost four years spoke to a national audience giving both sides of great controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his own independent program, in order to give only one side — the side that uses fundamental American principles as a yardstick for measuring all important issues.

If you believe that Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for those who want to think and talk and write on the side of freedom, you can help immensely by subscribing, and encouraging others to subscribe, to *The Dan Smoot Report.*

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